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A B S T R A C T
Following the theoretical approach of Herbold (1995), Gross and Krohn (2005), and Van de Poel et al. (2017),
this article argues that nuclear waste management is a real-world experiment. Based on this first assumption, we
examine how radioactive waste management (RWM) organizations conceive or organize their experiments.
Through three illustrative case studies in France, Belgium and Canada, we highlight how the RWM organizations
obliged to participate in complex networks and unable to completely control the experimental process, adopt
two different attitudes: an “open” or “closed” experimental mindset. We argue that these mindsets provide
different answers to the questions: which main variables to focus on, how and who should design them, how to
deal with conflicts and unexpected events, what are the justifications for participation and expert analysis, and
what are the expected outputs and outcomes. The findings underline that although some RWM organizations
have -at least since the participatory turn- had some ‘open’ mindset moments in some cases, they quickly revert
to a closed mindset. We conclude by emphasizing the need for practitioners and scholars to further examine and
evaluate the virtues of the open mindset when the experimenter assumes the program has a real-world ex-
perimental status. This status recognizes the limits of control over experimental conditions, allows for more
substantial moral considerations when making technical choices before wider audiences and allows for collective
sharing of responsibility, knowledge production and trade-offs over such a long-term and controversial program.
1. Introduction: Nuclear waste management as a Real-World
experiment
How to manage waste for decades, centuries or even a thousand
years? Among different types of waste, nuclear waste management re-
mains a wicked and crucially important problem to study. To begin
with, technically, there is no final long-term repository for high-level
radioactive waste (HLRW) currently in operation in a nuclearized
country [1,2]. The nuclearized world is still watching, and waiting for,
its effective implementation in Finland – one of the nuclear countries
most advanced in its long-term plan for the implementation of the
Onkalo final repository. In the same vein, Sweden, the other well-
known illustrative case of a nuclear waste management success story
[3], is facing new legal challenges, as the Swedish Radioactive Waste
Management (RWM) organization has yet to prove how long-term
safety can be guaranteed and how human beings and the environment
can be protected from radiation for centuries. If among the vast ma-
jority of RWM organizations across the world deep geological disposal
is still presented as the main and the only option to deal with such
waste, not all countries (especially those with small national territories)
have the appropriate geological conditions for such disposal. With no
shared international solution [4], several national technical and
geological uncertainties about this option persist [1].
Secondly, the suggested nuclear waste solutions are not only ex-
tremely challenging from a technical point of view, they are also highly
political. Procedures for siting nuclear waste repositories regularly face
deadlocks resulting from endless conflicts due to strong local and na-
tional opposition and the polarized positions of the stakeholders
[1,5–7]. Selecting a site is also closely connected to social, economic
and environmental constraints [8,9]. Variables such as regulatory
structures, legal frameworks, societal acceptance (or the lack thereof),
or the type of management, for example “non-transparent top down
approaches”, can the influence nuclear waste implementation processes
[1,8,10].
Thirdly, the sociotechnical challenges associated with nuclear waste
management occur in a context of uncertainty concerning the future
energy mix coupled with a heightened climate change debate where
nuclear energy regularly resurfaces as the potential energy of the future
[11–14]. Scholarly opinions regularly diverge on the added value and
pitfalls of nuclear energy futures [15]. Recent comparative studies
highlight the fact that nuclear waste futures remain strongly dependent
on nuclear energy futures and vice versa [16].
Lastly, these sociotechnical challenges are taking place in a parti-
cular and very unusual timeframe. Managing nuclear wastes is
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necessarily widely encompassing, as it concerns many different (present
and future) societies, far beyond human imagination. This temporal
regime therefore implies multi-generational strategies [17,18].
To sum up, on a daily basis, political representatives, public ad-
ministrations and waste producers must deal with the sociotechnical
unknown and unexpected [19]. Their job is to make decisions “facing
uncertain situations” [20]. Amidst this ocean of interconnected un-
certainties, in the past two decades, several RWM organizations have
reflected on new managerial practices and many cross-national projects
have been funded to improve the governance of nuclear waste man-
agement (see for instance ENTRIA, MoDern, MoDern2020, InSoTeC or
COWAM projects). Among other things, these projects suggest im-
proving managerial practices by resorting to an array of new delib-
erative procedures with experts and potentially affected publics and
stakeholders [2,6,21–23].
If some scholars have called this momentum of the early 2000s the
“participatory turn”[24], others, especially in environmental studies
and science and technology studies, have recently stressed that the
participatory turn in American and European countries extends beyond
the participatory turn as a “long-standing experimental practice”
[25,26]. Instead, they speak of an “experimental approach” in which
society becomes the main experimental site [27]. Among these scholars,
several scrutinized nuclear technologies in particular. They suggest that
nuclear waste management is a particular form of “real-world experi-
ment” where every national nuclearized country responsible for the
nuclear waste produced on its territory is the laboratory [28–31].
This paper follows those authors’ assumptions and scrutinizes an
important, but neglected, component of nuclear waste management
processes as real-world experiment: the role of the principal in-
vestigator. The question is, if nuclear waste management is a real-world
experiment, how do RWM organizations conceive or organize their
experiments? How do they address their audiences – the different
publics (scientific or not) who “witness” the experiment, when the la-
boratory boundaries are the national territory? And more generally,
how does considering radioactive waste management as a real-world
experiment affect and modify our perceptions and practices as analyst,
manager or affected stakeholder in such a controversial program?.
RWM organizations are one of the oldest actors and remain key
players in the development and implementation of long-term nuclear
waste programs. Analyzing and comparing their positions as principal
investigators makes it possible to emphasize power relations between
them and the audiences of such social experiments. Even if new actors
appear in the process, power asymmetries remain; environmental as-
sociations [32], affected local publics [10], leading newspapers [33],
new consultative bodies [7], nuclear waste management agencies or
nuclear industries do not have the same resources and knowledge to
influence the program.
Some authors consider that recognizing the experimental nature of
governing waste could, in the coming years, fundamentally change the
way in which actors (including nuclear engineers, social scientists and
policy-makers) perceive and assess their roles in the art of governing
controversial objects [27]. This paper brings social science and Science
Technology Study (STS) concepts into productive conversation with
natural and engineering sciences concerned with nuclear energy issues.
First, we stress that assuming the particular experimental nature of the
HLRW program means also considering the other instruments with
which the experimenter and the audiences have to deal. Second, there is
also a need to assess how an open experimental mindset – here defined
as a way of looking at, thinking about, and acting on the experiment –
confronts sociotechnical uncertainties. Both statements can differently
illuminate the logics and assumptions upon which nuclear waste
practitioners and engineers have rested historically.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Theoretical framework: The two mindsets of the experimenter in a real-
world experiment
In this paper, the theoretical focus is on the concept of “real-world
experiment” [34], which designates an experiment that revolves around
the passage of a technology or method from the confined laboratory-
controlled conditions into the outside world, in which technologies are
tested in real-life settings.
Real-world experiments share three characteristics with scientific or
technological experiments in natural science: instrumentation, de-
monstration, and uncertainty [35]. Firstly, any kind of experiment is
based on a series of instrumented interventions relying on material
devices and knowledge that are more or less formalized. Secondly, an
experiment is always associated with various forms of “demonstra-
tion”[36], proofs that imply audiences (scientific or not) who “witness”
the experiment, criticize it, encourage it or give it their approval. Lastly,
the outcomes of an experiment are always partially uncertain. In any
kind of experiment, there are important questions at stake such as
mastering the space in which an experiment takes place, identifying
who is authorized to conduct the experiment or witness its demon-
stration [37] or defining who can either approve or oppose it [38].
Beyond similarities with ‘traditional’ scientific experiments, the first
particularity of the real-world experiment is taking place “outside”,
amidst society, in an open and “non-scientific” environment. The la-
boratory space is therefore delimited at a very large scale [39]. Because
the experiment is conducted at real-life scale, the experimenters have
less control over the experimental conditions (e.g. containment is im-
possible [39]) and the consequences are indeed harder to assess and to
manage. Consequently, the experimenters have to deal with greater
risks and potentially irreversible effects [31] that are subjected to more
substantial moral considerations [40]. The second particularity is that
the demonstration takes place in front of a larger audience. Audiences
who “witness” the experiment are indeed multiplying. The decision-
making power is no longer solely in the hands of scientists, decisions are
also up to policy makers and newly introduced actors (for instance,
citizens or non-governmental organizations) who are henceforth in-
cluded in the experimental system. In addition to material devices and
knowledge production, the experimenters need to interact with addi-
tional instruments: policy instruments that can sustain or constrain the
experimental conditions.
In a real-world experiment, scientists are just one actor among
others, involved in a setting in which they are obliged to participate
[40]. As Gross and Krohn [41] summarize: “With this type of experi-
ment going on, […] the experimenter is bound to participate in com-
plex networks of actors embedded in institutional and natural en-
vironments that the actors cannot completely control”.
To face the particular conditions of real-world experiments, ex-
perimenters may adopt two different mindsets [42]. A mindset is de-
fined here as a way of looking at, thinking about, and acting on the
experiment. It refers to an experimenter’s acceptance of contingency as
well as the ability to live with ambiguity and to accommodate un-
controlled or unexpected events. Contingencies and ambiguities are not
new, but in a real-world experiment, coping strategies shift from at-
tempts at control and the confidence that it brings, to ironical, practical,
skeptical or radical positions and actions. This is a challenge for nuclear
waste managers and policy-makers, since they need to maintain their
legitimacy by undertaking actions to make a difference. As further ex-
plained below, a mindset can be “closed” or “open”. In both cases, what
matters is the way the real-world experiment is managed and its vari-
ables are controlled. Yet, both mindsets present crucial differences that
require a brief explanation.
The “closed” mindset is one that aims at controlling the outputs and
the outcomes of the real-world experiment. This mindset is character-
ized by the will to control the maximum number of variables and the
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unexpected effects of the experiment. The experimenter visualizes a
particular outcome and adopts rigid planning to achieve it. In this
mindset, the aim is to apply a pre-established protocol and to foresee
and contain any possible conflict or obstacle [43] that may arise during
the course of the experiment. Conflicts and unexpected effects are seen
as a something to be solved, and two types of instruments are used to
settle any conflict: scientific expertise and participation [42]. In this
mindset, the call on scientific expertise is intensified, presented as the
best way to provide appraisals that are “objective and independent”.
When a scientific expert’s involvement is not sufficient to put an end to
controversies and conflicts, procedures for broader consultation and
participation are set up as “an option for pacification” [42]. In this case,
expert and participatory procedures generally focus on reaching a
consensus. Regarding the decisional model associated with this ap-
proach, policymakers expect the experts and the public to work to-
gether and produce simplified, straightforward, decisions enabling
them to choose one option over another [42]. The decision model re-
lated to this first attitude, to echo the words of Stirling [22], tends to
prefer governance dynamics that favour “closing down” by suggesting
policy appraisals and commitments in favour of the “best” solution, the
single or definite result. It can provide prescriptive recommendations,
as it is indeed about finding the priority issues, identifying salient
knowledge and recruiting the appropriate protagonists to determine the
best output.
On the contrary, the “open” experimental mindset consists in fully
acknowledging that total control of the experiment and its effects is
neither possible, nor desirable. Rather than trying or wanting to control
all the variables, experimenters are ready to integrate any element of
surprise as additional variables in the experiment [27]. This mindset is
not just a state of awareness of novelty and surprise, it also assumes that
the actors will agree to be “flexible” depending on how the experiment
unfolds and to adapt their roles and their tasks accordingly [42]. With
this mindset, the experimenter accepts and welcomes the unknown and
does not shy away from sharing it with the audiences of the experiment:
“Such consultations are not the norm in many projects that deal with
known unknowns, since the official rhetoric is still that science delivers
fully reliable results. This also means that all the actors involved must
communicate their own ignorance, but this is not understood as a
failure but as a normal way of dealing with the unknown” [27]. It is
thus not a question of identifying a truth, of agreeing on the result to be
achieved, but rather, through this approach, one of facilitating the
conditions enabling “broader learning” through the unexpected and the
uncertainties [27]. The management protocols that come with this open
mindset are not set in stone. On the contrary, they require constant
revision and long-term reflection “to prevent the ossification of habit or
the entrenchment of narrow self-interest” [44]. The decisional model
associated with this second approach implies more “opening up” gov-
ernance dynamics. It reveals the open-endedness, contingencies of
technological choice. Marginalized perspectives, contending knowledge
or ignored uncertainties can be examined [22].
It is important to stress that the strategies of the experimenters are
not fixed once-and-for-all in a particular mindset: the experimenter’s
mindset may evolve over time, in a particular context, and according to
the stage of advancement of the process. An open experimental mindset
can help include a wider range of inputs and to consider neglected
uncertainties whilst a closed experimental mindset or “closing down”
moments are also necessary to reduce complexity [45,46]. The key
analytical question associated with this theoretical framework thus
concerns the moments and the situations in which an “open” or a
“closed” experimental mindset would be desirable. In so doing, it
questions the foundations of management itself and how the control of
an ongoing sociotechnical program is/should be applied over time. In
the following sections, we characterize the experimental arrangements
in HLRW programs in their context, describe the experimental mindset
each RWM organisation adopted over time and compare the results of
the different approaches.
2.2. The Cases, data collection, and analysis
We illustrate our theoretical framework empirically through the
temporal description of three case studies: France, Belgium and Canada.
These three nuclearized western countries were selected based on their
similarities concerning three criteria: first, in all three countries, their
respective RWM organizations (the Canadian NWMO/SGDN – Nuclear
Waste Management Organisation, the French ANDRA – Agence
Nationale pour la Gestion des Déchets RAdioactifs and the Belgian
ONDRAF/NIRAS – Organisme National des Déchets Radioactifs et des
matières Fissiles) all support deep geological disposal (with or without
reprocessing of spent fuel) as the main option to manage HLRW.
Second, the three countries, like many others, faced strong public op-
position when their RWM organization attempted to implement its
program in a defined territory (siting process). Third, facing the strong
opposition, all three RWM organisations took a “participatory turn”
[24] as they decided to include different publics and experts in their
nuclear technology assessment processes.
As researchers belonging to the interpretivism paradigm, we con-
sider that actors’ attitudes, preferences and discourses must be under-
stood in particular technological and political contexts. In our metho-
dology, we combine different qualitative methods to ensure in-depth
analysis and the triangulation of data collection [47]. Each case study
relies on extensive qualitative data collection and we use both primary
and secondary data.
The secondary data includes press archives, legislation, official re-
ports, official websites of nuclear waste management organizations. To
gather the primary data, in France and Canada, participatory observa-
tions were conducted at expected future sites for radioactive waste in
Bure, France, in 2014 and 2018, as well as at four volunteer munici-
palities in Canada (Manitouwadge, Nipigon, Schreiber and Ignace)
potentially concerned with HLRW repository in 2015. Being physically
on site allowed us to take into account the distances from place to place,
the isolation of the municipalities and the way opposition (where it
exists) and RWM organizations are located both symbolically and
physically in the areas concerned. In Belgium, our data come from a 11-
year run of almost uninterrupted observation and assessment of parti-
cipatory events on nuclear waste management, including public and
expert engagement.
In addition, a total of 87 semi-structured interviews were conducted
between 2012 and 2019 and some of the key informants were inter-
viewed up to three times. In France, 32 interviews were conducted in
2014 and in 2018; in Canada, 17 interviews in 2015; in Belgium, 38
interviews between March 2012 and June 2019. In France, most in-
terviewees were local committee actors (13) but also included national-
level representatives from consultative bodies (7), safety authorities
(4), HLRW experts (3), journalists (2) and the ANDRA (3). In Canada,
the interviewees included representatives of local committees (8),
safety authorities (1), federal consultative bodies (2), policy-makers (2),
the NWMO (2) and HLRW scientists (2). Most Belgian interviewees
represented the ONDRAF/NIRAS (21), safety authorities (6), waste
producers (6), HLRW experts (3) and the administrations concerned (2).
In this data collection, two limitations must be acknowledged that
should inspire further research. First, due to limited time spent on
fieldwork, important choices had to be made and it was not always
possible to interview informants again later to see if and how their
opinions had changed over time. Second, to make it possible to main-
tain control over data collection, national environmental associations
(for or against nuclear power) and cross-border publics were not in-
cluded in the list of respondents.
In order to analyze the complexities associated with each case study,
two writing strategies were used. The first was a full chronological
description of each case study, condensed from the main scientific re-
ports and articles [21,46,48–50]. To this end, we used the opening up
and closing down framework of Stirling [22]. This first strategy allowed
us to “understand the case studied in itself” and to restrict ourselves to
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the description and historical contextualization of the case [51]. In-
terviews were systematically categorized and tagged with Mosaiq
software in order to understand the extent to which HLRW assessments
and commitments were open or closed.
Based on these extended descriptions, the second writing strategy
consisted in adopting an approach based on “thematic entry points”. In
this paper, the results of the case studies are described in terms of an
explicit theoretical framework (considering HLRW management as a
real-world experiment) in order to illustrate a theoretical point (the
importance of exploring the role of the main experimenter, the RWM
organization) [51]. We focused in particular on the type of actions and
discourses of RWM organizations and how these were perceived by
other stakeholders.
To compare the narrative of the case study analysis in the following
sections, we use two successive phases that are common to all HLRW
programs: conceptualization and operationalization. The con-
ceptualization phase is generally associated with the adoption of the
generic and strategic long-term program without targeting a specific
territory. It encompasses what RWM experts call “policy” and “plan-
ning”. Even if site selection, construction, operation, post-closure and
monitoring are already addressed at the generic level or in underground
laboratories at this stage of the program, the latter is usually “placeless”
[52]. During the operationalization phase, RWM organizations further
develop and adapt the program to one or more specific territories or
sites. Partly related to the “siting” phase in RWM jargon, the policy and
planning towards monitoring phases focuses on selected areas.
3. Exploring the mindsets of RWM organizations in France,
Belgium and Canada
The following sections discuss three distinct types of real-world
experiments in the governance of high-level radioactive wastes in
France, Belgium and Canada. For each phase (the conceptualization and
the operationalization phases), we highlight how the mindset of RWM
organizations evolved over time, depending on the interferences of
policy instruments and audiences that may be active, reactive or pas-
sive.
3.1. Closed mindset of the ANDRA in France?
In France, both conceptualization and operationalization phases
have faced, and still face, strong local opposition.
The opposition started in 1987 with the publication of the ANDRA
report that supported deep geological disposal as the main option and
identified four potential sites to host the final repository [53]. After
three years of violent conflicts between the ANDRA and the local po-
pulation, the French Prime Minister decided to suspend the program for
one year [54,55], asking the ANDRA to temporarily halt its search for
sites [56]. In so doing, the government admitted that the ANDRA’s
manner of regulating and controlling the real-world experiment had not
been successful in legitimizing the conceptualization phase it originally
promoted for the management program. It required the intervention of
a new Parliamentary Office (OPECST – Parliamentary Office Tech-
nology Assessment) to assess the suggested HLRW program and act as a
mediator between civil society and the ANDRA experts [56]. OPECST
suggested a new conceptualization phase and suggested new informa-
tion and dialog procedures, as well as the exploration of new nuclear
waste management options. OPECST entering the scene dramatically
changed the context of the real-world experiment. ANDRA became just
one actor among many other institutions. For each aspect, each pro-
blem encountered, a group, committee or organization was asked to
organize one or more consultations to evaluate and propose a solution
for one or several dimensions of the HLRW program. As a result, the
situation became even more complex, each actor following their own
protocols and operational rules and having a broad initiative capacity
in their field of competence [57]. Nevertheless, a first legal instrument,
the Waste Plan Act of 1991, was passed that maintained the exploration
of new research options for HLRWmanagement. In parallel, the number
of expert and public national consultative bodies multiplied, and the
Local Information and Oversight Committee was created to initially
inform and monitor the HLRW research program. During the following
fifteen years, numerous experts and public national consultative bodies
contributed to the conceptualization phase.
During the conceptualization phase, the ANDRA observed the pro-
gress of the real-world experiment from a distance. The agency was
officially commissioned to study two research options (surface storage
and deep geological disposal), with a mandate to assess only the tech-
nical aspects of these options. OPECST members suspected the ANDRA
of preferring the research option it has long favored: deep geological
disposal [58]. The alternatives to deep geological disposal studied were
still considered inadequate (transmutation-separation was a utopic so-
lution but too costly and storage on the surface was only to be en-
visaged as a transitory solution on the way towards the deep geological
disposal [58,59]. In the ANDRA’s opinion, this option had the ad-
vantage of presenting variables that could be controlled, with man-
agement stages that could be planned. The alternative of surface storage
was historically “under-researched” considered as “less interesting for
scientific programmes” (personal interview with ANDRA re-
presentative, March 23, 2015). The ANDRA kept its closed experi-
mental mindset, which prevented it from deviating from the trajectory
to which it had hitherto committed. This position was reinforced over
time by other institutional bodies who rallied to the deep geological
disposal option – including OPECST and the scientific expert of the
National Assessment Board [60–62].
Yet, if the ANDRA managed to continue with closing down ap-
praisals around deep geological disposal, the outcomes of the many
publics’ and experts’ consultations forced them to accept some com-
promise. One crucially important but unexpected output of the con-
ceptualization phase process was the addition of the reversibility
principle to this research option, defined later as ‘the capacity, for
successive generations, either to continue the construction and then the
exploitation of successive tranches of a repository, or to re-evaluate the
choices previously defined and to change the management solutions’
(Law of 25 July 2016). Parliament validated this principle and con-
firmed the future host territory at Bure in the Planning Act of 2006. This
legal instrument of 2006 marked the beginning of the operationaliza-
tion phase.
During the operationalization phase, the role of the ANDRA became
more visible at the local level: the organization received from the
government the mission to identify a restricted area to host the future
final repository. Based on its previous geological research, ANDRA
identified a geological zone with several scenarios for surface facilities
and consulted the Local Information and Oversight Committee.
Although the latter demanded that the geological zone and its location
first be discussed, ANDRA explicitly limited the discussion to surface
facilities [63]. For a member of the Local Committee, ANDRA con-
sidered the underground to be purely scientific matter (Personal in-
terview with Local Committee representative December 2, 2014). In
this way, ANDRA ascribed specific roles to active local audiences. After
a series of other legal consultations, a new governmental decision ap-
proved ANDRA’s suggestion in 2010: a zone called ZIRA (for Zone
d’Intérêt pour la Reconnaissance Approfondie) was delineated in order to
extend and confirm, among other things, the previous results of the
underground laboratory at Bure [64].
At the national level, RWM also continued negotiations on the in-
dustrial project design with the nuclear industries behind closed doors
as this was a “sensitive issue” (Personal interview with ANDRA re-
presentative, October 17, 2014). OPECST denounced “the lack of
transparency” in the choices made between ANDRA and the nuclear
industries that “limited Parliamentary control” [65]. The conclusions of
the National Public Debate Commission responsible for organizing and
opening the HLRW programme to public deliberation in 2013
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underlined the same concern: the updated cost assessments of the
project were “unavailable” to the public [66]. Economic and scientific
trade-offs were de facto beyond the scope of the public debate and
therefore did not allow the public to fully evaluate all aspects of AN-
DRA’s demonstration. Currently, the ANDRA is working on site char-
acterization, preventive archaeology and environmental monitoring
[67]. At the local level, public and expert opposition has never stopped
[68]. The local opponents have declared the future host zone to be an
‘area to defend’ [69], an area once defined and identified that is literally
occupied by the project’s opponents.
We stress that once the Planning Act of 2006 and the deep geolo-
gical disposal was validated, the relevant ministers, the waste producers
and the ANDRA took control of the program in the exact same way that
had led to the undermining of the legitimacy of the program in its
original conceptualization phase. ANDRA, with the support of waste
producers and relevant ministers, controlled what information was
available to whom and the preferred option(s) for financial support.
They regulated the way in which the debates were framed and in-
directly, what roles were expected from the public. They planned the
financial and technological design of the HLRW program in a restricted
context, following the pre-established experimental protocol of 2006
and adopting a clear-cut decision-making process. Particularly in the
operational phase of the real-world experiment, the ANDRA gave the
impression, to paraphrase OPECST’s statement, that the implementa-
tion of a management option was exclusively a techno-scientific and
economic issue to be negotiated among experts [65,70]. Consequently,
we conclude that ANDRA and other associated nuclear actors never
changed their closed experimental mindset concerning the governance
of HLRW. They have continuously positioned themselves outside the
ongoing real-world experiment. The operational phase of the French
HLRW management program can be seen as the affirmed continuation
of the former regime of experimental practices that tend to control and
regulate all variables of the real-world experiment and in which the
experimenters position themselves outside the experiment underway.
Once the program entered its operational phase, the decision-making
power remained in the few experimenter’s hands (the ANDRA, the
ministries concerned and the waste producers) [21].
Nonetheless, the decision validated by the Planning Act in 2006
favoring the deep geological disposal was not the exact replica of the
one proposed by ANDRA in the 1980s. Although alternatives to the long
preferred option of deep geological disposal became less attractive, one
big change did take place: the notion of reversibility was introduced
[71], thereby questioning the design of the deep geological disposal and
raising important sociotechnical challenges. This notion opens up a new
space for negotiation in the operationalization phase, a potential new
foothold for audiences of the real-world experiment to take a more
active part in it, which may lead to a deeper revision of the re-
commended solution. How to technically conceive and organize the
retrievability of wastes? How to organize active safety (i.e. ensuring
safety with human action as opposed to the passive safety, which means
safety without human action [72]), for how long? In other words, this
condition triggers new uncertainties in the ongoing experiment, which
comes with its own technical and political challenges. We conclude that
reversibility enacted by Parliament in 2016 could become a key ele-
ment that threatens to inflect the closed experimental mindset of the
ANDRA toward greater openness. As an unintended consequence, the
seemingly harmless condition of ‘reversibility’ will put nuclear actors’
experimental mindset to test, which may breach their reluctance to
integrate surprise, to address any unknowns regarding the con-
sequences of future experiments and to acknowledge the great tech-
nological and social complexity of HLRW governance. Speaking about
reversibility of scientific and technical choices opens a space for debate,
a possibility to ‘unlock’ a scientific and technical trajectory that, so far,
had been successful in excluding all the others. In the long term, the
notion of reversibility may be envisaged as an instrument for real-world
experimentation that facilitates the progressive adaptability of the
decision-making process and reinforces the need to take society into
consideration in the ANDRA experimental protocol.
3.2. Open mindset of the NWMO in Canada?
Like in France, the beginning of the conceptualization phase of
HLRW program, in the 1970s, was characterized by local opposition
[73,74]. It started with the publication of two reports, the Hare report
[75] and the Canadian Nuclear Research Center (Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited – AECL) report [76] that supported the deep geological
disposal concept, identified adequate geological areas and suggested a
siting process located in Ontario Province [77]. In 1978 and in 1981,
the Federal government and the Ontarian government mandated AECL
to further study the deep geological disposal and permanent storage
options and to organize “co-operation and consultation with the com-
munities involved at all stages of the program” [77]. At that time, the
development of the conceptualization phase was the responsibility of
AECL, which reaffirmed its support for deep geological disposal. In
1988, the federal Minister of Natural Resources mandated an in-
dependent commission, the Environmental Assessment Panel (also
called the Seaborn Panel after its Chairman), to review the con-
ceptualization phase proposal for nuclear fuel waste management and
the AECL disposal concept. The Seaborn Panel conducted several par-
ticipatory experiments. Adopting an open experimental mindset, the
Panel organized expert and public consultations over a period of nine
years. The outcomes of their work strongly influenced the subsequent
legal instrument, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act of 2002. Indeed, Parlia-
ment decided to suggest a new conceptualization phase and to create a
private not-for-profit company in charge of insuring the entire devel-
opment of every phase of HLRW program, the NWMO. The Nuclear Fuel
Act gives free rein to the private entity. As a result, unlike France, the
capacity for expert and participatory initiatives was not multiplied and
divided among several actors but concentrated in the hands of a single
actor. Since 2002, as the exclusive experimenter, the NWMO has had
considerable influence on the organization of the real-world experi-
ment. Its initiatives directly affect the process and the content of the
HLRW program. After its creation and for the following three years,
new management options were considered and compared (deep geo-
logical disposal, storage at nuclear reactor sites and centralized storage
either above or below ground) and new expert and public consultations
were organized. The work undertaken by the NWMO can be analyzed as
a continuation of the successful experiment undertaken earlier by Blair
Seaborn and his colleagues. For example, at the start of public con-
sultations, its strategy was to broaden the consultations to not only
discuss the options to implement but also to any kind of issues they
found relevant to the HLRW program. In this sense, the NWMO adopted
an open mindset during the conceptualization phase.
Based on its data collection, in 2005, the NWMO submitted a report
that endorsed the deep geological disposal concept with one condition,
‘the Adaptive Phase Management’, a progressive program combined
with strong local support. The Canadian Government validated
NWMO’s suggestion. The Canadian government established the broad
principles for the real-world experiment but delegated and reaffirmed
all power of initiative to the NWMO. The political commitments defined
a light framework, a set of specifications for the missions to accomplish
but without institutionalizing the practices or setting a pre-established
protocol. In this sense, both policy decisions adopted at the federal level
illustrate a more distanced commitment to real-world experimentation
in nuclear waste governance. The Canadian legal instruments oversee
the HLRW program, validate its principles, but do not specify the
practices.
The beginning of the operationalization phase started when the
NWMO invited experts and the general public to collectively design the
operationalization stages of the HLRW program. This is a power that
the NWMO chose to share with Canadian citizens during the design
phase. Although the protocol is written exclusively by the NWMO, it
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was repeatedly resubmitted to those who helped prepare it. Instead of
focusing on the final product of the real-world experiment (the out-
comes of the operationalization phase) the Canadian NWMO focused
more on the protocol, the ‘roadmap’ composed of nine steps that was
validated during the public and scientific inquiries, and then later by
the Canadian government, as a NWMO representative explained: “[…]
the even though we don’t know what the outcome of that siting process
would be, we have got a roadmap that we were in agreement that we
could walk together on” (Personal interview with NWMO re-
presentative, June 8, 2015).
The NWMO officially started its site selection process in 2010.
Twenty-two communities expressed interest in being part of the in-
dustrial project. As a result, the space for negotiating the variables of
the real-world experiment has seen its contours identified, recognized
and concentrated in particular places: this is where the volunteer local
communities are geographically located, but without being definitive
for two reasons. First, the host areas for the final repository need to be
determined and technically studied in more detail. Second, the NWMO
initially focused on volunteer municipalities before rapidly expanding
the scope to “surrounding” [78] areas including the volunteer First
Nation and Métis Communities and any community that may be in-
terested in the future. In this operationalization phase, the NWMO has
full responsibility for excluding communities that do not meet the
previously established socio-technical criteria. Nevertheless, the
NWMO also chose to share its right with the local collectivities as they
could withdraw from the process at any time. Therefore, although
nothing is imposed on the areas concerned, the real-world experiment is
being conducted with the people who are directly concerned by the
experiment. The actors affected by the experiment have the capacity to
take the initiative but local audiences have been mainly passive. So far,
criticism is neither controlled nor absorbed, but is more or less non-
existent. The routinized and permanent participatory spaces have the
tendency to ‘devitalize’ the effective deliberative participation [6].
Murphy stressed that one of the explanations could be the current
‘placelessness’ of the project [52]. Currently, the ongoing siting process
is limited to two potential communities: Ignace and the already nu-
clearized South Bruce. The NWMO also thinks the populations con-
cerned today will perhaps broaden. Indeed, (local) critics and broader
interests could be stimulated at the next steps of the process when the
implementation phase will effectively ‘take place’ at a particular site.
In this real-world nuclear waste experiment, we stress that the
NWMO does not control; it organizes. Since its creation, it seems to
have never stopped maintaining an open mindset. It does not attempt to
convince others that it possesses all the knowledge needed to solve the
problem or that it is capable of accomplishing the missions entrusted to
it. Instead, it draws its legitimacy rather in the way the experiment is
collectively organized (transparency, shared initiative, protocol to build,
collaborative process, etc.).
The NWMO assumes that outcomes are undetermined. Aware that it
does not have the capacity to control all the variables that make up the
real-world experiment, it advances step-by-step thanks to a series of
micro-decisions taken collectively with the audiences partaking in the
experiment. The NWMO prefers talking about “adaptation” rather than
“control” (Personal interview with NWMO representative, June 8,
2015). It perceives adaptation as a key ingredient in the success of a
legitimate real-world experiment. The agency assumes its ignorance
regarding the outcome of the siting process and when it faces present or
future unexpected effects, it is thoroughly transparent as it appeals for
new discussion with the partners involved.
Grasping the NWMO’s approach is also the way to understand why
the 2005 recommendation in favor of the deep geological disposal was
not the exact replica of the one proposed by Canada’s nuclear energy
center a few years earlier. “Adaptive Phased Management” (APM) is the
approach that legitimizes the closure of possible options in favor of the
deep geological disposal because, at the same time, it opened a per-
manent negotiation space at each step of the process, fostered iterations
and modulated the different decisions made. APM is a form of experi-
mentation that involves both process and content. On the one hand, it
can be seen as the NWMO’s recognition of an open experimental atti-
tude and as its formalization as a management principle. On the other
hand, it tends to closely combine societal facets with technical facets;
allowing the possibility that one can modify the other because they are
both closely interrelated and interdependent.
3.3. Closed mindset of the ONDRAF/NIRAS in Belgium?
Based on its previous experience with a low-level radioactive waste
program, the Belgian RWM organisation proactively launched a parti-
cipatory phase for HLRW during the conceptualization phase in the
early 2000s. In 2004, the relevant ministers requested a comparative
study of all the available options (called Strategic Environmental
Assessment) and recognized, as the ONDRAF/NIRAS had previously
underlined, the need for the public consultation. The ministers also
explicitly asked the ONDRAF/NIRAS to suggest a Waste Plan for HLRW.
Although it had been considering the deep geological disposal option
for several years, the first consultation with key stakeholders in 2009
was more open, as it addressed the appropriate method of consultation
to be chosen and the questions to be asked. Next, the Belgian RWM
organisation collectively created the agenda for the HLRW program.
The agency started from a blank page, with no pre-established protocol;
it did the same during subsequent participatory dialogs and at the in-
terdisciplinary conference [46,48]. From 2006 to 2009, it also dele-
gated the inventory and evaluation of technical options to nuclear ex-
pert analysts connected with the nuclear industry. In this context, the
ONDRAF/NIRAS organized more than it controlled. But when the
evaluation committee composed of social scientists criticized the fact
that the ONDRAF/NIRAS was the main and only organizer, the agency
decided to delegate the next participatory event (Citizen’s Conference)
to an independent organization, the King Baudouin Foundation. It ac-
cepted the ‘risk’ of not being able to control the outcomes emerging
from the conference, which attests to their open experimental attitude.
During this period, we can say that Belgian RWM organization proac-
tively adopted an open experimental mindset.
However, when the final version of the Waste Plan was under pre-
paration, ONDRAF/NIRAS adopted another approach that sought to
control the produced outcome. At that moment, it forcefully suggested
what it had long considered to be the best option: passive deep geolo-
gical disposal. Whether or not intentional, this shift organized a hier-
archy of social and technical dimensions and narrowed the debate from
a technical point of view.
More precisely, among the likely options to consider for HLRW
management, looking at the breadth of results produced by the Belgian
Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN) over the past 35 years and those of
the public consultations (2009–2011), the ONDRAF/NIRAS clearly
positioned itself in favor of one particular outcome. Retrospectively, we
can conclude that the broader participatory consultations did not
modify the technical management program originally envisaged by the
ONDRAF/NIRAS. Studying all available options from 2006 to 2009
resulted in the confirmation of what the ONDRAF/NIRAS already
considered and previously supported: it seems there is no other ap-
propriate alternative to deep geological disposal. The various con-
sultations helped reinforce the long-favored technical option. The
Waste Plan certainly underlined the importance of taking the project’s
social dimensions into account, but the very structure of the Plan
showed that this dimension was still clearly considered as distinct from
the techno-scientific aspect of the project. For instance, the ninth
chapter discussed the project’s societal dimension and was completely
separate from the discussion of the deep geological disposal and its
technical aspects [79]. When the ONDRAF/NIRAS technical report in-
cluded certain conditions emerging from the public consultations, such
as the controllability or reversibility of the system, these conditions
could only be considered as relevant in the priority framework of the
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repository’s passive safety concept, as envisaged by the technicians and
engineers working on this issue. Presented in this way, the Belgian
RWM organization tended to control all the variables and anticipate the
potential effects of outside requests by placing emphasis on its concept
of long-term passive safety. In a way, the ONDRAF/NIRAS limited the
uncertainties inherent to a possible integration of the societal dimen-
sion in the scope of its deep geological disposal project.
While waiting for a political decision on the conceptualization phase
for almost a decade, the Belgian RWM organisation has progressively
shifted to a closed experimental mindset. The topicality of maintaining
the legal public consultation during the COVID-19 crisis and the Belgian
lock-down situation (April–June 2020) is a good illustration. In the
absence of a clear political framework on HLRW program, the
ONDRAF/NIRAS has chosen to no longer work proactively, especially
in the realm of public consultations.
We argue that one explanation for this shift is the repeated per-
ception of powerlessness of the ONDRAF/NIRAS representatives in the
face of the lack of governmental support for the HLRW program they
suggest. It is a variable the agency cannot control. The Belgian RWM
organization, as a public interest body, has less margin for action than
the Canadian NWMO. For example, experiments entailing consultations
could not be conducted or extended without the agreement of the re-
levant ministries. Belgian ONDRAF/NIRAS’ initiatives are subject to
Government oversight even if it benefits from considerable autonomy in
its decision-making and management capacities. Secondly, although the
agency wields considerable influence, the ONDRAF/NIRAS has failed to
convince the political authorities that its choice of deep geological
disposal is the only option. The Belgian RWM organization has to deal
with a state of political uncertainty concerning the option to be im-
plemented and for continued funding of the associated research and
development programs.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the Belgian RWM
organization positions itself outside the experiment it aims to control.
Quite the contrary, the body is fully aware that it is an integral part of
it. For instance, the Belgian RWM organization fears that its proactive
actions could be badly interpreted by the local and regional actors who
may be included in later phases of the process. On this subject, the
agency considers that the political decision about the conceptualization
phase will give social and legal legitimacy to its recommended option.
According to some ONDRAF/NIRAS representatives, its actions will be
legitimated and recognized by civil society through its elected re-
presentatives, especially the Government. But the recent (absence of)
ONDRAF/NIRAS actions have already created several tensions: the
public potentially concerned (at the local level and across borders) have
expressed negative opinions about the process and the content of the
ONDRAF/NIRAS project. The ONDRAF/NIRAS is thus waiting for a pre-
established protocol to be designed by the national political re-
presentatives. They seem to expect a legal instrument supported by
policy-makers that would provide the official outlines of future ex-
periments.
Compared to the two other countries, the HLRW program in
Belgium is at a crossroads. It is the only country studied where the
conceptualization phase remains uncertain. Indeed, even if the
ONDRAF/NIRAS strongly supports the deep geological disposal option,
Belgian federal authorities have not officially validated any option. At
most, there have been political declarations in successive government
statements promising to make a commitment but the national HLRW
management policy remains to be defined. There is no operationaliza-
tion phase yet and the long-term project remains lost in ‘placelessness’
(Table 1).
4. Discussion: Assuming the experimental status of real-world and
its consequences
Following the illustrative cases of France, Belgium and Canada, the
aim of this section is to launch a debate on the challenges of considering
the HLRW program as a real-world experiment and on the importance
of experimental mindsets in such a context.
We have seen that the instruments mobilized to produce knowledge,
the forms of demonstration, the roles of different audiences and the
expected outcomes are modified when they evolve in an open and “non-
scientific” environment. We argue that assuming the experimental
status of such a program may affect our ability as an analyst or prac-
titioner (manager, controller, or committed stakeholder), to examine
and reconsider the underlying assumptions and management practices
that drive a particular program. If all RWM organizations and other
stakeholders (including regulatory bodies) embrace the uncertainties
inherent in the HLRW program, their mindset fundamentally changes
the way in which these uncertainties are managed and communicated.
Their mindset also influences the choices of instruments, the type of
demonstration, the roles of experimenters and audiences they expect.
We consider that there are three issues that need to be addressed
systematically by any analyst or practitioner wishing to be part of, or to
evaluate, a radioactive waste management program:
• Concerning recognition of the experiment: Do the experimenters
recognize the experimental status of such a program? Do the audi-
ences do the same? Why (not)?
• Concerning the potential of instruments: How does using (new) in-
struments such as law change or affect the experiment?
• Concerning the type of control: In a context of high uncertainties,
what is controlled or what should be controlled (according to
whom)?
First, acknowledging or refusing the experimental status of a nu-
clear waste management program may be strategic. The actors re-
sponsible for the experiment and the audiences of the experiment (no
matter who they are) may resist, refuse and oppose the status of the
program being qualified as a ‘real-world’ experiment. Their aim may be
to ‘close down’ the experiment, refuse to name it as such, or to only
accept the status as temporary, until a final solution is found. By con-
trast, actors may adopt another position, which is to acknowledge the
experimental nature of the HLRW program, to envisage it as a new hold
on the governance of radioactive waste. This position considers the
experimental nature of the program as the permanent and normal
course of action. This first distinction is fundamental. Indeed, in the
former case, actors tend to see and position themselves ‘outside’ the
real-world experiment. They issue a diagnosis from the outside and then
formulate a response that tends to produce effects that are beyond their
control. Anything beyond their control is subsequently considered as a
‘challenge’, something that must be overcome and fixed in order to
arrive at a situation that is an improvement according to the stated
objective or the previously established result to attain [80]. In the latter
case, the actors responsible for the experiment see and position them-
selves as acting from inside the permanently ongoing real-world ex-
periment. Along with the other actors, they take action in order to
modulate, not control. The experimental process can be the object of
permanent or temporary instrumentalization, supporting the ideolo-
gical interests of the actors – whether these are activists opposing a deep
geological disposal concept or nucleocrats – and reinforcing their po-
sitions.
With regard to this first question, a distinction needs to be made
between the experimenter(s) and the audiences of the experiment (the
direct or indirect target of the program). It concerns their capacity to
insert themselves, whether consciously or not, in the ongoing process.
Several scholars stress that for nuclear waste experiments, audiences
are not always explicitly seen or recognized as such [31,40,81]. Con-
sequently, the actors affected by an experiment may not even be aware
of their status as experimental subjects. The experimental site can also
become structured and the protocols can come into play without, for
instance, really considering the potential host territories and their in-
habitants. This raises several ethical and social challenges, as already
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mentioned by Felt et al. [82]: ‘we are in an unavoidably experimental
state. Yet this is usually hidden from public view and public negotiation
[…]. If citizens are being enrolled routinely without negotiation as
experimental subjects, in experiments which are not called by name,
then some serious ethical and social issues would have to be addressed’.
But do the embedded actors agree that we live in an experimental state?
Why (not)?
Second, the analysis of our three case studies underlines the fact
that in the real-world experiment, new devices or instruments including
legal instruments may be mobilized. Their initial objectives, their long-
term roles, their effects (irreversible or not) and the way in which the
different actors mobilize them needs to be analyzed in more detail.
What should be the role of law? We have seen that the Belgian RWM
organization considered it as a way to validate the program and to plan
the next steps of their suggested research agenda accordingly. In
France, the successive laws that were passed were instrumental and
binding in the organization of the roles and practices of actors and the
continuation of the HLRW program. In Canada, the law seems to sustain
HLRW principles giving the NWMO more freedom to organize its sci-
entific and consultation process. Three potential uses of legal instru-
ments can be identified. On the one hand, legal devices can validate
new practices a posteriori, once stabilized. They can also plan and define
in detail the next practices to adopt. In these two cases, the law can also
rigidify future actions. But legal instruments can also be used as tools
that define a minimum to be reached or that validate the main man-
agement principles to be respected during the ongoing process. As
Barthe and Lindhart [42] point out, a new debate must be reformulated
on the implicit hypotheses and biases of the adopted policy: “It is a
question of the way to formulate policy that definitively realizes the
impossibility of settling all matters once and for all. This would fully
assume the observation that any form of intervention, any “solution” is
nothing more than the relaunching of a continued process of transfor-
mation and revisiting of what poses a problem”. Lastly, in some cases,
like in Belgium, we add that the absence of legal instruments may also
be seen as an opportunity to innovate and to further experiment.
Third, concerning the question about what is it that should be
controlled, two different framings are possible depending on the ex-
perimental mindset of the organization in charge of managing the ex-
periment. We highlighted two kinds of experimental mindsets in our
three case studies. They both provide different answers to the question
of the main variables to focus on, how and who should design them,
how to deal with conflicts and unexpected events, what are justifica-
tions for participation and expert analysis, and what are the expected
outputs and outcomes.
The first one a ‘closed’ experimental mindset that aims to control the
outputs and the outcomes of the real-world experiment without con-
sidering any kind of opening up moments. In the case of HLRW man-
agement, this means considering a particular outcome, deep geological
disposal, with pre-established design and advanced planning, and as-
suming that all stakeholders will share the same vision of how to
technically and socially achieve the expected outcomes, regardless of
any uncertainties that may arise. This used to be the case in France,
Belgium and Canada before the so-called ‘participatory turn’. To a lesser
extent, it still is the case in Belgium when the ONDRAF/NIRAS refuses
to take repeated public requirements seriously, or in France, when the
ANDRA promotes one particular design of the deep geological disposal
based on what OPECST called “opaque” financial and technical choices.
Audiences are excluded from certain technical and financial negotia-
tions and cannot witness the full demonstration. In these cases, the aim
of producing scientific knowledge is to demonstrate how uncertainties
can be anticipated and how the program favoring the deep geological
disposal concept can respond to those uncertainties. For instance, in
France the ANDRA wants to demonstrate that Bure is and will remain
the best host site for the project. The main focus on the demonstration is
on the desired outcome and how to ensure that the provided solution is
safe enough based on the original plan. This strategy remains the most
common one [27].
The second mindset is the ‘open’ experimental mindset that in-
tegrates the element of surprise and complexity. With this mindset, we
highlighted that additional variables (such as reversibility or adaptative
phase management conditions) can raise substantial sociotechnical
challenges. In the case of HLRW management, it means partially re-
cognizing that the final version of the envisioned outcome (deep geo-
logical disposal) beyond the conceptualization phase is not yet known.
Rather than aiming at full control over the program, efforts target the
modulation of the long-term project and its design according to possible
future uncertainties. Here, the aim of scientific knowledge is to de-
monstrate how the HLRW program can absorb uncertainties and how
the deep geological disposal concept can be modulated accordingly.
Our analysis has shown that the Canadian NWMO modulates the HLRW
program according to the successes or failures that occur during the
process (e.g. the withdrawal of one local municipality or the in-
adequacy of a local underground territory).
5. Conclusion: Open mindset as the only way to deal with nuclear
Real-World Experiment?
For radioactive waste managers, experimenting in the ‘real-world’,
implementing or controlling a sociotechnical program on a particularly
difficult object remains extremely challenging. Outside the confined
space of a laboratory, experiments take on another dimension: every
initiative of the experimenter is likely to have irreversible consequences
and lead to strong lock-in. Experimental conditions are no longer
completely under control, uncertainties are a sort of ‘default mode’ but
are at the same time technical, political, societal, environmental and
economic. In this paper, we have shown that the Belgian, the Canadian
and the French RWM organizations are fully embedded in the experi-
ment and that they must deal with complex networks and tough con-
straints. Operating on bounded site(s), their national territory, they also
have to demonstrate their capacity to manage the unknown and the
Table 1




Conceptualization phase Open mindset of OPECST Invisible role of ANDRA Open mindset of the powerful NWMO Open mindset of the powerful
ONDRAF/NIRAS
Selected outputs Reversibility principle (supported by Government
decision in 2006)
Adaptive Phase Management principle (supported
by Government decision in 2007)
/(No government decision)
Operationalization phase Closed mindset of powerful NWMO. (supported by
policy framework that strictly constrains
experimenter’s roles and practices)
Open mindset of the powerful NWMO (supported
by policy framework that strictly constrains
experimenter on HLRW principles)
Closed mindset of the powerless
NWMO (with an unchanged policy
framework)
Siting phase Host territory (one preselected site, Bure) Host territories (two potential volunteer sites) Host territories: (none)
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unexpected in front of larger audiences, some of whom are very skep-
tical, to say the least.
In search of sustainable solutions in the face of current socio-
technical uncertainties, the experimenter’s mindsets in HLRW man-
agement or, more generally, in the management of contested techno-
logical objects, are crucial. First, because experimenters such as RWM
organizations often appear to be the most powerful actor. Even in the
‘open air’ laboratory, the experimenter usually remains the leader of the
experiment and endorses multiple roles of primary importance: taking
the initiative, having the main funding support, having the power to
delegate the consultation processes if needed, and occupying a parti-
cular spot in the policy room. As the experimenters mainly in charge of
conceptualizing, managing, and operationalizing the long-term HLRW
program, the RWM organizations in France, Belgium and Canada deal
differently with uncertainties that arise in their management programs.
Here, we have highlighted how the RWM organizations all tend to
control particular program parameters such as their preferred research
and development programs, the technical and safety aspects of it, or
who they consider to be relevant actors to influence the program.
We stress that the different forms of real-world experimentation in
France, Belgium and Canada vary because of the contrasted experi-
mental mindset of the actors involved in the experimental HLRW pro-
gram. We suggest that we gain analytical purchase by viewing RWM
organizations’ mindsets as more or less open or closed. These two
mindsets aim to deal with uncertainty, ambiguity or the unknown, but
with different entry points. They both differently influence the key
variables to focus on at first glance, the underlying premises of the end
result and its design, and the relevant people to demonstrate or witness
the HLRW program. The two mindsets provide different spaces for
conflict and unexpected events and mobilize different justifications for
expert participation and analysis. As a result, the power of the audi-
ences who wish to shape the HLRW program is not the same and the
resulting outputs and outcomes are modified accordingly.
The closed experimental mindset concentrates above all on con-
trolling the final result of the HLRW program, its design is fixed in
advance according to a strict schedule. With this mindset, the ongoing
process aims to achieve and justify the desired result at all costs: the
experimenter must demonstrate that the initial protocol can address the
problems and avoid any kind of surprise. Conflict and unexpected
events have to be resolved. Public participation (if necessary) and ex-
pert analysis are used as a “pacification” tool to help close appraisals
and commitments (in the sense of Stirling). With a closed experimental
mindset, there seems to be an expectation that the public is more
passive in validating the program predefined by the experimenter.
By contrast, with the open experimental mindset, the primary focus
is on quality control of the process and the design of the final outcome
is considered to be changeable and adaptive. With this mindset, the
experimenter recognizes that it is impossible to control all the variables.
Therefore, planning is flexible and the protocol includes the possibility
of surprises and unexpected events. The rationales for public partici-
pation and expert analysis are rather “normative” tools because they
are used to collectively design opening up appraisals and commitments.
Here, the experimenter asks for more proactive audiences: not only do
they validate the experimenter's results, but they expect to generate
knowledge and feed the HLRW program.
For decades, a ‘closed’ mindset has been the norm for some RWM
organizations. With the participatory turn, active audiences have forced
them to adopt at least some ‘open’ mindset moments. But our illus-
trative cases also highlight the fact that in some cases, the RWM or-
ganizations quickly revert to a closed mindset, thereby limiting the role
of the audiences. The variations from one mode to another over time,
the reasons for these changes and their consequences for HLRW pro-
grams should be studied in more detail in the coming years.
More importantly, one question remains: regarding the real-world
experimental status of the HLRW program, should the open-mindset be
the only way to deal with nuclear waste in a real-world experiment? We
emphasize that assuming the real-world experimental status of the
controversial program means two things to the experimenter: re-
cognizing the limits of control over experimental conditions and con-
sidering more substantial moral arguments when making technical
choices before wider audiences. Decision-making power is no longer
solely in the hand of the RWM organizations and should not be. Faced
with the impossibility of controlling all the variables in these time-
frames, responsibilities, knowledge production and trade-offs have to
be shared collectively as do the potentially greater (unexpected) risks
with irreversible effects and financial responsibilities will de facto be a
“common good”. Sociotechnical issues and ignorance need to be com-
municated more systematically and to be considered as a normal way of
dealing with uncertainties. In particular, a more comparative explora-
tion is needed to identify the virtues and potential pitfalls of the open
mindset in a controversial energy program.
Considering HLRW management as an ongoing ‘real-world’ experi-
ment and assessing how open the mindset is on these issues is an in-
vitation to analyze and act differently on waste management programs.
Taken seriously, it offers opportunities to embrace uncertainties with
humility and collectively rather than simply pretending there is a way
to control them completely.
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